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COVID-19 has severely impacted society, in terms of health but also economic survival of individuals. 
Unless adequate support is provided, the pandemic will have long-lasting effects especially on the 
lives of the most vulnerable, often working in the informal sector. In this paper, we present a case 
study drawing on systems thinking and complexity theory, outlining how the city of Mumbai has 
responded to COVID-19. We find a multi-faceted scenario where non-profit organisations, businesses 
and citizen volunteers operate alongside government bodies to support Mumbai’s population to 
overcome this pandemic. We provide broader policy lessons, as well as more specific lessons in 
relation to particular actors, from the first wave of the pandemic stressing the importance of becoming 
‘systems thinkers’ and highlighting the importance of forming new partnerships and exploring new 
modes of knowledge sharing to effectively respond to crises. 





The COVID-19 pandemic is unprecedented and different from any other crises we have experienced 
in recent history. This pandemic is hitting the most vulnerable individuals in developing countries 
hardest in terms of their health but also in terms of their economic survival, especially in India with 
276 million people living below $1.25 per day (World Bank, 2015). If not supported adequately by 
relevant government bodies, non-profit organisations and others, these individuals will experience 
long-lasting and devastating side effects of the COVID-19 crisis that go beyond health impacts. In this 
paper, we present a case study outlining Maharashtra state’s response with a focus on Mumbai, 
drawing on government documents, newspaper articles and ‘lived experience’, to provide broader 
lessons as to how different organisations can work together most effectively in responding to 
pandemics or other types of crises. Given the complexities of the COVID-19 pandemic, we use a 
systems-thinking approach to grapple with the numerous inter-related factors that shape the 
response to this crisis. 
Unlike any other event before, COVID-19 has demonstrated that decisions made to deal with one 
crisis, i.e. COVID-19, may lead to other secondary and tertiary crises. Many commentators of the 
pandemic recognise that governments need to take urgent action to tackle COVID-19 such as imposing 
strict lockdown measures but these decisions will have an effect on many other aspects of our lives. 
For example, the United Nations (2020) are expecting an additional 71 million people to be living in 
extreme poverty due to the COVID-19 pandemic with South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa being 
particularly badly affected (p.24). Already fragile health systems will be further eroded due to COVID-
19 and improvements in maternal and child health will be reversed, e.g. the under-5 mortality rate 
per month could increase from 35% to 44.8% with maternal death per month rising from 30.3% to 
38.6% (United Nations, 2020). Oxfam (2020) highlights that by the end of 2020 more than 12,000 
people per day could die from hunger which may potentially be more than those dying from COVID-
19. These examples illustrate that decisions made by governments to tackle COVID-19 have wide 
consequences – some of these consequences can be seen immediately, others will take time to 
emerge. At the same time, the pandemic and its consequences are not unfolding in a linear manner. 
Governments are faced with multi-layered and complex scenarios that are shaped by multiple 
competing issues as well as continuously changing and evolving dynamics. Taking a systems view in 
the analysis and decision-making process can help governments to better understand the causes and 
effects of the decisions they are taking because of the systemic and complex nature of the pandemic. 
Hence, we apply a systems lens to be able to better understand the multitude of connected factors 
that play a role in the context of COVID-19 in the Indian context and which need to be understood in 
order to be able to succeed in providing integrated policy-solutions to this crisis. 
We recognise that the pandemic is far from over and the situation in India is fluid with rapid and 
dramatic developments occurring almost daily. We chose to focus on a specific time period during the 
first wave for the purpose of developing a coherent narrative allowing us to reflect on the response 
to COVID-19. Therefore, we draw on the experience of Mumbai during the first wave of the pandemic, 
dated 11 March to 9 September 2020, to illustrate how a systems-thinking approach could support 
the decision-making process in the context of a pandemic. Much of Mumbai’s economy is dominated 
by informal sector workers with many micro and small enterprises providing livelihood opportunities 
to the poor. The informal sector is particularly vulnerable to crises with many of the poor having seen 
dramatic losses of incomes (Malik et al, 2020) as jobs and markets vanished overnight following the 
tough lockdown measures imposed by the Government of India on 24 March 2020. The shutting down 
of economic activity, a loss of income for already very poor and vulnerable populations, a large 
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number of migrant labourers unable to return home, and COVID-19 cases steadily increasing, 
combined to pose enormous challenges for local, state and national government bodies.  
Mumbai is located in the state of Maharashtra which has been the hardest hit state in India in terms 
of COVID-19 infection rates. As of 9 September 2020, Maharashtra had 924,000 cases (21% of India’s 
current total number of cases) and 27,027 deaths. Within Maharashtra, the vast majority of cases in 
the first wave were found in and around Greater Mumbai, including in large and densely populated 
informal settlements where a large number of the migrant labourers that come to the city in search 
of work, stay. Mumbai makes an interesting case study not only because of the current crisis and the 
state government’s active crisis leadership, but also because of its long history of crisis management 
dating back to the early 19th century when it was faced with cholera, plague and flu pandemics as well 
as famines and frequent droughts. 
In this paper, we first set out our theoretical framework along with our methodological approach 
before presenting the case study material which consists of a short history of pandemics in the state 
of Maharashtra to provide the backdrop to the context of Mumbai, followed by an account of how 
the pandemic unfolded and evolved in Mumbai itself. We then discuss the impact it has had on the 
city and its inhabitants (in terms of health, livelihoods and economic survival) and provide a detailed 
description of the complex challenges local, state and central government bodies faced before 
outlining how they and other non-governmental actors responded to this pandemic. We find a multi-
faceted scenario where non-profit organisations, businesses and citizens operate alongside local, state 
and central government to support marginalised individuals affected by the crisis. In the conclusion, 
we aim to provide specific lessons in relation to particular groups such as different government 
entities within Mumbai and NPOs that may be of value to grapple with subsequent waves of the 
pandemic. 
Theoretical implications: Systems thinking and complexity theory  
Recognising the complexities of the COVID-19 pandemic, we employ a systems-thinking approach 
drawing on elements of complexity theory to unpack the various inter-related factors underlying the 
successful management of crises. We attempt to capture the various notions of complexity and 
interdependence as this allows us to visualise the various cause and effect relationships. We use 
complexity and systems literatures to create a conceptual framework that guides our understanding 
of the multiple dimensions of the COVID-19 crisis in Mumbai.  
COVID-19 has brought to the fore that systems thinking is crucially important to making better 
decisions in a complex and nonlinear world (Ramalingam, 2013; 2020). Studying the pandemic from a 
complex systems approach allows us to consider the multiple interlinked and sometimes unexpected 
changes and outcomes which in turn provide us with pointers as to how best to deal with complex 
and systemic challenges and ultimately build a more resilient system.  
Using a systems perspective broadens the analysis of a complex system by recognising that actors and 
their interactions are influenced by institutions, thus affecting process change (or the evolution of and 
response to a crisis) (Ramalingam et al., 2008; Mytelka, 2000; Ramalingam, 2013 & 2020; HM Treasury, 
2020). Roles of actors and their relationships often evolve over time. Therefore, the system needs to 
be flexible enough to evolve with the changing requirements of new networks and partnerships.  
On Complex Systems  
The literature on systems and complexity suggests that change (whether a crisis or other change) 
emerges and evolves in a non-linear way with actors (organisations and or individuals) playing a 
central role. Their interactions, knowledge exchanges, and feedback loops are in turn conditioned by 
 4 
institutions (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Mytelka, 2000; Ramalingam, 2008; Birney, 2017). Figure 
1 shows the centrality of actors, their interactions and knowledge flows within a complex system, it 
also presents how the multiple actors can shape the different components that form a particular 
system. 
A system is complex and evolutionary. The system changes shape and structure over time as different 
actors group and regroup, in different ways, in response to external and internal factors that influence 
their behaviour. Therefore, complex systems see continuous change as actors, processes, dynamics 
and the system itself change over time. Systems thinking recognises that the world is characterised by 
complexity and interrelatedness (Glouberman and Zimmerman, 2002; Kurtz and Snowden, 2003; 
Ramalingam et al., 2008; Ramalingam, 2013; Barbrook-Johnson, 2020). Actors and processes within 
the system are interconnected and interdependent but as noted above change in a system does not 
take place in a linear manner. Because of the interconnectedness and the non-linearity of systems, 
behaviour of the system and the outcome and change of the system based on the interactions of its 
elements, can be unpredictable and disproportionate (Ramalingam, 2013). The pandemic mirrors this 
in the way it has evolved resulting in crises that were initially not predicted, such as the migrant crisis.  
Figure 1: Complex System and COVID-19  
 
Source: Authors own, adapted from Mytelka (2000). 
Actors of different kinds interact within the system (Mytelka, 2000; Ramalingam, 2013; Ramalingam 
et al. 2008). As in the case of this pandemic, these actors may include entrepreneurs, private 
businesses, non-profit organisations (NPO) representing civil society, government actors at the local, 
state and national levels, the traditional and social media, and so on. The different actors interact and 
share information, learn from each other and react to changes in the system.  
In terms of networks and partnerships, these grow out of shared values and trust built over a period 
of time. Because of the importance of personal networks, individuals rather than organisations often 



































information1 flows through the system. The most effective partnerships are those consisting of 
stakeholders with different levels of knowledge and capabilities so that each can provide something 
new to the others.  
Systems and their networks of actors are likely to be denser at the core and less dense at the periphery 
(Ramalingam, 2013; Borgatti and Everett, 2000). Actors embedded in the denser core of the system 
including their networks, may be more entrenched, more bureaucratic and less nimble than those at 
the periphery. Yet, their impact over time may be deeper and more far reaching. However, this in turn 
makes them less able to respond and adapt quickly to new changes and challenges. A reason for this 
difficulty in responding quickly may be path dependence, whereby history and previous actions 
influence the way actors engage with new situations (Cowan and Gunby, 1996; Cowan et al. 2000). 
Actors at the periphery on the other hand, may have fewer entrenched behaviours and dense 
networks, or path dependence to fall back on but they are able to regroup and react faster. During 
the pandemic, for example, governments that are at the core of the system have taken longer to 
implement new decisions even though these had subsequently large impacts; while NPOs and 
individual citizen groups that are at the periphery of the system were able to act faster as less 
bureaucratically entrenched but with smaller impacts.  
Given the different abilities to respond, networks and partnerships elicited different responses 
according to their location in the system, i.e. faster and less impactful responses by actors located at 
the periphery of the system and slower but more impactful responses by the actors located at the 
core.  
Another important aspect of systems is knowledge and information sharing which happens through 
interactions between actors within the system, providing the basis for learning and knowledge 
creation (Ramalingam, 2013; Ramalingam et al. 2008; Mytelka, 2000; Lundvall, 1992). Given the 
central role of accessing and adopting new knowledge and information, critical reflection, functioning 
feedback loops and learning are important so that actors can adjust to new challenges or improve the 
way they are dealing with existing ones as new knowledge becomes available. Feedback loops and 
processes (as represented in Figure 1 by the solid blue arrows in the central circle) shape how elements 
and dynamics in the system change and emerge.   
Learning and feedback loops are important to improving existing knowledge to better manage crises 
and or to avoid mistakes, i.e. constant feedback sharing among actors within a system can lead to the 
development of best practices with the aim to contain the spread of the virus during a pandemic. 
However, feedback loops can also have a negative impact, they can reinforce entrenched behaviour, 
lead to scare mongering, or sharing of false information. During the pandemic, for example, traditional 
and social media have had mixed effects in this regard, both amplified important information and 
knowledge sharing but they also contributed to fear and fake news. Feedback loops that are 
ineffective and slow can result in the slow implementation of new directives at the grassroots level, 
such as raising awareness among citizens and the police of what kind of shops may be allowed to 
remain open, or for what reasons citizens may move about in public.  
Finally, hard and soft institutions are an integral part of any system, they govern the way actors and 
processes behave in the system (David, 1994; Lundvall, 1992; Ramalingam, 2013). Hard institutions 
refer to rules and regulations of a country and or region. Soft institutions refer to the habits and 
 
1 Based on Davenport and Prusak (2000), we understand information to mean data that has been contextualised, 
categorized, calculated and condensed; while knowledge refers to know-how and insights based on 
understanding, experience and context. 
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practices informed by tradition, culture and history. Trust which is governed by soft institutions is also 
crucially important but it often takes time to build up. These institutions shape how actors and 
processes respond within a system. They also influence the characteristics and conditions of a 
particular system and the behaviour of actors within it. This in turn affects local decision-making 
processes and the handling of a crisis as well as how a crisis unfolds. In short, context matters. During 
the pandemic, we have seen this play out in how different countries have chosen to manage the crisis, 
and how the citizens have responded.  
We have developed Figure 1 to summarise such a complex system in the context of this pandemic. 
The boundary of this system is the region that we look at, in this case Mumbai. Outside the system we 
find macro-level influences that shape the policies and regulations of the central, state and local 
governments such as pandemic preparedness, quality and quantity of infrastructure, adoption of best 
practices as shared by national and international bodies (e.g. World Health Organisation), the 
structure of the economy, the socio-economic spread of the population and the culture and history 
that informs habits, practices and behaviours of the various actors involved in the system.  
In summary, this complex system comprises of a range of different actors involved in the pandemic 
relief efforts including government, non-profit, private and healthcare sectors, as well as concerned 
citizens and the media. Networks and partnerships allow actors to interact, build relationships and 
share knowledge and information that are key to learning, feedback and quick response, reaction and 
adaptation to new challenges and situations that emerge as the pandemic evolves. The information 
sharing and feedback loops can lead to positive change by allowing quick reactions to new information 
from the ground. However, they can also reinforce entrenched behaviour, such as organisations 
operating the way they always have been, thus not allowing them to adapt with sufficient speed to a 
pandemic or crisis situation of this scale. Finally, institutions (hard and soft) are key as they influence 
the way actors behave and react. 
Methods: An evolutionary case study approach 
As COVID-19 is an ongoing crisis, primary data collection may be inappropriate, as it would distract 
key individuals from their work when they are most needed. Instead, we use an evolutionary case 
study approach drawing on government documents, social media posts and newspaper articles 
complemented by historical analysis of state level information focusing on the time period from 11 
March to 9 September 2020. Key concepts of evolutionary economics have inspired the choice of our 
methodological approach. Evolutionary economics sees evolution as a non-directed, step-by-step 
process that lacks a specific goal or endpoint – a view that borrows from Darwin’s view on how species 
evolved – and is largely concerned with understanding dynamics and change of phenomena in our 
society (Hodgson, 2003; Nelson, 2009). This approach allows us to examine how the multi-actor 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Mumbai has evolved over the first 100 days and to explore 
how these reactions have been informed by India's historical and evolutionary path.  
Furthermore, we also draw on ‘lived experience’ (Given, 2008) as a key cornerstone of our case study 
to better understand the complex interactions taking place between the range of actors involved in 
tackling the pandemic to tease out what these actors do and how their choices, habits, and traditions 
interact dynamically within the broader system. We include ‘lived experience’ as an additional 
methodological choice as it nicely complements our evolutionary case study approach and allows us 
to apply the core components of our conceptual framework. ‘Lived experience’ has its roots in 
qualitative phenomenological research (e.g. Dahlberg and Dahlberg, 2003; Dowling and Cooney, 2012) 
and is a concept that has come to the fore in recent years in social policy analysis to highlight the 
importance of subjective experiences in informing empirical enquiries. Through ‘lived experience’, 
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researchers cannot only respond to peoples’ experiences but they can also relate to how people live 
through and respond to certain experiences (Boylorn, 2008; McIntosh and Wright, 2019). Since one of 
the co-authors of this paper is based in Mumbai, India, we were in the fortunate position to get a 
sense of what it means to live through the changes this pandemic has brought about, including how 
people experience and cope with effects triggered by the actions of the different actors involved in 
responding to this crisis.  
The next section presents the case study material starting with a short history of pandemics followed 
by a timeline detailing how the pandemic unfolded in Mumbai before moving on to the discussion 
section.  
The case study 
Background: A short history of pandemics in Maharashtra 
To better understand India’s response to COVID-19, it is worth reflecting on how the country has 
managed pandemics in the past. Maharashtra and Mumbai (Maharashtra’s capital city) have a long 
history of pandemics, e.g.  frequent outbreaks of the cholera (as early as 1820), the plague (1896-97) 
and the Spanish Flu (1918-20). The plague of 1896-97 was the last significant pandemic Mumbai 
suffered from and in order to suppress the plague, the colonial government at the time responded by 
making hospitalisation of victims mandatory, by segregating contacts, by disinfecting houses that were 
plague-ridden, by inspecting travellers and detaining people that were suspected to be infected and 
by stopping any inflow of visitors from overseas (Klein, 1988; Sarkar, 2011). These measures were 
violently detested by the Indian population which tried to circumvent many of these measures 
especially forced hospitalisation and segregation (Klein, 1988; Sarkar, 2001). The plague outbreak in 
1896-97 saw 1,000 deaths per month in Mumbai alone which led to an exodus from the city, thus 
spreading the disease further to other parts of India. The colonial government felt it had no choice but 
to install “secondary and tertiary perimeters of defense” (Klein, 1988: 743) where inspection stations 
were established to screen people leaving the city and if infected, they were forcibly removed from 
trains and other modes of transport and hospitalised (Sarkar, 2001). The Indian population lived in 
fear and opposed these measures; Ramanna (2012) notes that the “people were more troubled by 
the measures to repress it [the plague] than by the epidemic itself” (p.12). Violence and street fighting 
scenes became a daily occurrence. To prevent further escalations and to control the population 
thereby the disease, the colonial government decided to make use of the military, e.g. using Sepoy 
regiments where available, searching for plague victims in a manner that looked very much like a 
surprise military raid (Klein, 1988: 745; Sarkar, 2001). These actions were justified under the 1897 
established ‘Epidemic Diseases Act’, which gave the government the power to enact special measures, 
prescribe regulations and impose penalties to combat pandemics (Government of India, 1897). The 
government response to the Spanish Flu in 1918 did not look much different. The 1897 ‘Epidemic 
Diseases Act’ was invoked to isolate and forcibly hospitalise victims of the disease. Where necessary, 
force was used to enact these measures. The use of force and the application of military metaphors 
in the context of diseases is not new and dates back as far as the first cholera pandemics in the early 
19th century, which coincided with a decisive phase of British expansion in India (Arnold, 1986).  
Reflecting on crisis management under British Rule where the fight against diseases reaching the scale 
of pandemics was often conducted like a military campaign to defend civilians (Klein, 1988; Sarkar, 
2001; Arnold, 1986), it is striking to see how approach and language to crisis management have now 
changed. Originally, crisis management was in the domain of the military that sought to defend 
civilians from a particular threat, a famine, a drought or a health crisis (Alexander, 2002). However, 
crisis management has gradually evolved moving away from using force to control the population to 
collaborating and sharing of information to protect the population (Masri and Moore, 1995). This 
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change was due to a realisation that more flexible and adaptive approaches were better suited to 
responding to the multifaceted and complex realities of crises (Alexander, 2002). Hence, a wider range 
of actors got involved in emergency planning and preparedness, i.e. central and local governments 
alongside civil society organisations, businesses, etc., seeking to protect rather than defend civilians 
from a threat.  
COVID-19: Mumbai’s experience 
These changes in how crises are managed today can be usefully illustrated focusing on the response 
to COVID-19 in Mumbai. The first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Maharashtra was reported on 9 
March 2020 in Pune, when a couple with travel history tested positive. From then onwards, the 
number of COVID-19 cases spread rapidly in Maharashtra with Mumbai having had its first positive 
cases on 11 March 2020. Hence, our case study focuses on the time period 11 March to 9 September 
2020, which falls within the first wave of the pandemic. 
Maharashtra was one of the worst affected states in India in relation to COVID-19 infection rates 
(Figure 2) and the state’s capital city Mumbai including its wider metropolitan region was one of the 
worst affected cities in India with more than 100,000 recorded COVID-19 cases and 6,000 deaths 
(Financial Times, 29 July 2020) suggesting that more than half of the population living in Mumbai’s 
slums may have had COVID-19 already and are more like to get infected by the disease (Malani et al, 
2020). These figures may not be surprising, Mumbai is a city with a great deal of inequality in terms of 
income, living conditions and access to basic services including education and healthcare. These 
inequalities have been mirrored in how the pandemic has impacted the city. There is clear difference 
in who has been hit the hardest by the crisis. Those already vulnerable have been in the worst position 
– both in terms of at risk of getting the virus, but also in terms of living in crowded conditions during 
lockdown, in terms of losing their income, and in accessing healthcare facilities. Not only do poor 
people live in much smaller and cramped conditions, but the lockdown was also monitored more 
harshly in these areas (NDTV, 2020b; BBC News, 2020a, 2020d; Scroll, 2020a). Thus, these inequalities 
led to the crisis affecting the poor disproportionately and further reinforcing it. 
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Figure 2: Number of COVID-19 cases across India’s 14 most affected states and union territories 
 
Source: State bulletins, COVID-19 Tracker India, data as of 12 August, 2020. Available at: 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1103458/india-novel-coronavirus-covid-19-cases-by-state/, accessed 14 
August, 2020. 
To deal with the rapidly spreading COVID-19 outbreak, many Indian states such as Karnataka, Haryana, 
Delhi and Goa invoked the 123-year old ‘Epidemic Diseases Act’ of 1897, the Government of 
Maharashtra (GMH) did so too on 13 March 2020, and at the same time they set up a high level 
committee to oversee and  mobilise additional resources to be able to deal with COVID-19 (Quartz 
India, 2020). Table 12 summarise the sequence of events in responding to COVID-19 in Maharashtra 
and Mumbai focusing on the actors involved and the types of their responses. It is worth noting that 
some actors such as the Government of India (GOI) may impose responses or invoke legislation to 
grapple with the crisis but the implementation is often left to other actors such as state or local 
governments or NPOs, etc. For example, the nation-wide 21-day lockdown announced on 24 March 
2020 by the Prime Minister (PM) of India was then implemented by the state government (which 
manages policing) and the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC)3 – Mumbai’s local 
government. The BMC for example, began putting 1 metre markers outside shops to denote social 
distanced queuing (The Hindu, 2020). At the same time, the Mumbai police which was in charge of 
ensuring compliance, set up check-posts across the city, and began using vehicles such as auto-
rickshaws with speakers to spread awareness and warnings about the lockdown, as well as using 
security cameras and drones to patrol high density areas such as the many crowded informal 
 
2 While Table 1 and the case study briefly summarise the key events and actions during the first two months of 
the COVID-19 crisis, we recognise that a lot of additional activities, processes and engagements were underway 
concurrently, which we are unable to include in this paper due to space constraints.  
3 BMC is translated as the Corporation of Greater Mumbai. It should be noted that while we discuss the role of 
BMC here primarily, Greater Mumbai is part of the larger Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR) which 
incorporates a number of local government bodies for neighbouring areas - including the Municipal Corporations 
of Thane, The Kalyan-Dombivli, Navi Mumbai, Panvel, Vasai-Virar, Mira-Bhayandar, Bhiwandi-Nizampur, 
Ulhasnagar. The MMR is has a dedicated GMH organisation, Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development 
Authority (MMRDA), overseeing urban development including transport and housing.  

















settlements in the city (NDTV, 2020b). The BMC would also declare certain areas in the city - ranging 
from a building to a street or a whole locality - which had positive COVID-19 cases as ‘containment 
zones’ which were sealed off and issued with a curfew with no option to leave that zone or enter it 
(MumbaiLive, 2020). We discuss these multiple layers of response between and across actors in more 
detail further below.  
As a result of the nation-wide lockdown, supply-chains were initially disrupted because wholesale 
markets shut and transport of goods even from within states became a challenge and initially grocery 
shops ran low on fresh food, with few vegetable vendors on the streets, while the population tried to 
stock up (Mid-day, 2020a; Mid-day, 2020b; Mid-day, 2020c). This resulted in long queues to buy 
groceries and concerns over social distancing grew. Employers were asked by GOI and GMH to 
continue to pay salaries to both casual and permanent workers (Scroll, 2020b). However, that stopped 
quickly in the informal and construction sectors and a lot of day labourers – many of them migrants – 
quickly found themselves in a difficult situation with no access to food or with no money to buy food. 
At the same time, borders were closed and there was no public or private transport. The result was a 
desperate need for delivery of food and essential items and the provision of shelters within Mumbai, 
as well as the start of a wave of internal migration back to villages in Maharashtra and beyond, often 
on foot (BBC News, 2020b; BBC News, 2020c). In this context, the rising involvement of additional non-
governmental actors such as NPOs and citizens can be seen (Das and Pardeshi, 2020; Indian Express, 
2020b, 2020b; Mint, 2020c; BBC News, 2020c). They responded in areas where the government was 
limited in its reach, or where relief was urgently required.     
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Table 1: Timeline of events 
Date Type of response? Who was 
involved? 
13 March 2020 ‘Epidemic Diseases Act’ of 1897 was invoked to enable the 
state to hospitalise individuals with symptoms. Cinema 
theatres, sport centres, and malls were closed as a precaution. 
A committee of high-level ministers and civil servants was 
constituted to work on a COVID-19 mitigation strategy. 
GMH* 
18 March 2020 The BMC announced that shops would remain open only on 
alternate days as a first step towards ensuring social distancing. 
 BMC 
20 March 2020 GMH’s Chief Minister (CM) declared that all offices other than 
those deemed essential services needed to remain shut until 
end of the month, and people were urged to stay at home. 
GMH 
22 March 2020 CM declared that Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
would be imposed with effect from the following day with the 
aim to prohibit people’s movements except for emergencies. 
GMH 
23 March 2020 CM announced the closure of district borders and a state-wide 
curfew, starting the lockdown in Mumbai and the rest of the 
state. 
GMH 
24 March 2020 The PM announced a 21-day nation-wide lockdown which 
entailed a ban on leaving the home apart from emergencies 
and for getting food and essentials; all shops other than 
pharmacies, and super markets were shut; all commercial and 
private establishments and companies were shut with 
mandatory work from home (only banks remained open); all 
educational institutions were shut; all places of worship shut; 
all public transport initially shut and after some time all non-
essential public and private transport shut; prohibition of all 




by GMH and 
BMC 
29 March 2020 Standard operating procedures to be followed by all healthcare 
facilities with respect to COVID-19 was released. 
GMH 
End of March 
2020 
Financial packages for food and shelter of migrants, and a large 
number of relief camps were set up. 
 
Many of these shelters, soup kitchens were operated by NPOs, 
private enterprises and private citizens. 
 
The shortage of personal protective equipment triggered 
efforts by the private sector to rejig their manufacturing 
capacities to produce face masks, face shields, personal 






8 April 2020 The BMC made the wearing of facemasks compulsory in public 
places in Mumbai. 
BMC 
 
10 April 2020 In response to a deluge of false information, a Prohibitory Order 
banning the dissemination of incorrect, derogatory or 
discriminatory messages through text and WhatsApp messages 
or social media platforms was released. 
Commissioner 




11 April 2020 Maharashtra’s CM announced that the lockdown in the state 
would be extended until the end of April. Shramik special trains 
were organised to bring migrant workers back to their homes. 
NPOs and private citizens engaged in tackling the migrant crisis 




Mid-April 2020 Upgrading of hospitals and designating hospitals as special 
COVID-19 ones. Setting up of quarantine facilities.  
 
Private enterprises supported the government in upgrading 
health facilities. Ola and Uber taxi operators supported getting 





14 April 2020 The PM further extended the lockdown to 3 May 2020. GOI 
1 May 2020 The PM announced further extensions to the lockdown to 17 
May 2020 and further to 31 May 2020.  
GOI 
30 May 2020 The PM announced easing of the lockdown in many parts of 
the country. However, the lockdown continued in Mumbai 
given the continued rapid rise in COVID-19 numbers.  
GOI 
* Key: GOI= Government of India; GMH= State Government of Maharashtra; BMC = 
Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation; NPO= Non-profit organisation. 
Sources: Business Standard (2020); The WIRE (2020); Indian Express (2020a); BBC News (2020a); 
Scroll, 2020a; Das and Pardeshi (2020). 
 
A few weeks into lockdown, Mumbai’s healthcare facilities began feeling the strain as there was a lack 
of infrastructure to deal effectively with the COVID-19 pandemic (Scroll, 2020). The result was an 
initially high number of fatalities. The healthcare sector had competing priorities that needed 
attention – from a lack of adequate infrastructure that needed to be put in place and upgraded quickly 
including establishing a contract tracing system from scratch, to staff not turning up to work, to a 
shortage of protective equipment and testing kits, to citizens being turned away from hospitals for 
treatment (BBC, 2020; Mint, 2020a; Malani et al. 2020). The BMC and GMH in Mumbai reacted to 
these challenges by upgrading hospitals and classifying some as COVID-19 hospitals. They also opened 
previously closed hospitals which were then designated as COVID-19 hospitals and equipped with 
specialist equipment. Private hospitals were ordered by GMH to cooperate and provide COVID-19 
treatment requiring them to give up 80% of their beds to be run under the government, as well as put 
in place a pricing list for both COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 healthcare services to avoid predatory 
pricing (BBC, 2020; Mint, 2020a; Scroll, 2020). At the same time, a vast number of quarantine facilities 
were set up, in large open spaces, in temporarily unused buildings such as schools, the local Nehru 
Planetarium and sport arenas as well as in hotels (whose regular operations were shut), where COVID-
19 patients with mild symptoms as well as those at risk of COVID-19 transmission (such as close family 
members) would have to stay in quarantine (Mint, 2020a; NDTV, 2020). These hotels were later also 
used as quarantine facilities for travellers. There were initial issues with people not wanting to stay in 
quarantine facilities or trying to avoid getting tested, something not too dissimilar to the reactions of 
people affected by the response of the colonial government to the Great Plague in 1896-97. 
As the lockdown persisted, the economic fallout from the lockdown and the pandemic became evident 
– with businesses at the risk of shutting down permanently, and individuals losing their jobs and 
income. Individuals with jobs in the informal sector, e.g. drivers, maids, cleaners or those working in 
restaurants or for themselves in micro units, were hit the hardest (Mint, 2020b). At the same time, 
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the fallout from the lockdown also led to an increase in domestic violence and worries about poor 
children, especially young girls, losing out on years of schooling with much higher risks of early or child 
marriage (United Nations, 2020). This pandemic did not only cause one crisis, but it unfolded in a way 
that caused multiple crises. The initial fear of the spread of the virus overloading the healthcare system 
in Maharashtra, resulted in the early lockdown in March (Das and Pardeshi, 2020). The aim was then 
to contain the virus and to buy for time to upgrade the healthcare infrastructure that was in poor 
shape. However, the locking down of a large part of the labour force that was both informal and 
vulnerable to shocks – day labourers and temporary workers– that often resided in the city 
temporarily, resulted in another crisis (BBC News, 2020d; Mint, 2020b). These individuals ran out of 
food and money and needed to return home – but returning home was not an option with all public 
transport shut, hence many then began to walk leading to India’s largest internal migration since 
partition (Guardian, 2020). Suddenly the GMH had several crises on their hands – first a health crisis, 
followed by a day labourer and subsequently a migrant crisis. This was soon followed by another, 
economic, crisis as large parts of economic activity could not be sustained during the pandemic. These 
multiple crises triggered a response by the government, alongside which a rapidly growing, and multi-
faceted response by non-profit organisations (Das and Pardeshi, 2020; Indian Express, 2020b), 
individual citizens (Mint, 2020c; India Today, 2020a; BBC News, 2020c), and private enterprises (India 
Today, 2020b) could be observed with the objective to provide relief for day labourers, stranded 
migrants and others in need of food and shelter. The next section discusses this response in more 
detail.  
Discussion: A complex systems analysis of the pandemic in Mumbai 
The actors: Multiple levels of response 
Multiple actors were involved in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, each had different roles to 
play and different agendas, networks and relationships to navigate. The response to the crisis was 
multi-faceted and collaborative alluding to the complex and systemic nature of the COVID-19 
pandemic. This section discusses the various actors and their engagement with each other and how 
they collaborated in unusual circumstances viewed through the lens of a complex systems-thinking 
framework. 
Government 
The government policy response to the crisis took place on three interconnected but distinct levels: 
the GOI, the GHM and the BMC. Adding to the complexity, the GOI is dominated by the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) while the GMH is run by an opposition coalition with Shiv Sena4 at the helm – which 
is also in charge of the BMC. Furthermore, the Mumbai Metropolitan Area (or greater Mumbai) has 
three distinct local governments (as described in footnote 3), further complicating coordination issues. 
While the decisions by the GOI would override the decisions by the GMH and the BMC, it was the GMH 
and the BMC that implemented decisions in Mumbai through their representatives in the different 
wards (districts) of the city. A major challenge for the government entities were the multiple urgent 
priorities that the multiple crises we discussed above created. The focus on containing the spread of 
the virus caused a migrant and humanitarian crisis and later an economic crisis. There was an urgent 
need to improve healthcare infrastructure. However, at the same time ensuring food supply was a 
challenge. The administration had to continuously adapt and find new solution often with scarce 
funding available, and prioritise among a long list of urgent tasks. This is the context in which the 
growing role of NPOs in responding to this pandemic should be seen. 
 
4 Shiv Sena is a Maharashtrian regional party founded by Bal Thackeray. The other coalition partners are the 
regional National Congress Party and the Congress. 
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NPOs 
The NPOs were the actors that were able to respond most quickly to the unfolding migrant and 
humanitarian crisis. They used their ability to mobilise communities quickly and capitalised on their 
experience working with vulnerable communities to rapidly assess the situation locally and respond 
with shelter, food packages, sanitation kits, water and other necessities. This initial relief work 
focussed on providing food and essentials to poor communities, it later involved working with migrant 
communities as well arranging transport to get migrants home. Furthermore, the traditional funders 
of NPOs – the foundations, corporate social responsibility departments of private enterprises and 
individual donors - converted their programmes to provide funding for relief operations. New forms 
of fund raising were also developed such as online donation portals allowing the rapid mobilisation of 
funds.  
Citizens 
At the same time, private citizens responded to the crisis by organising themselves online to 
coordinate fundraising and relief efforts. They also had their feet on the ground forming 
neighbourhood groups to distribute masks and food, famous Bollywood actors embarked on large 
scale relief efforts for day labourers and migrant workers providing food, shelter and subsequently 
transport helping them to travel home.    
Private enterprises 
Mumbai has a large private sector as it is India’s financial and business capital. The operations of many 
private enterprises were severely affected as offices shut down and staff had to work from home, thus 
working practices had to change significantly and rapidly to account for this sudden move online. At 
the same time, private enterprises began to participate in relief work. Some operated shelters and 
soup kitchens for poor individuals, others embarked on making face shields for healthcare staff. Some 
manufacturing enterprises repurposed their factory floors to produce personal protective equipment, 
face masks and other specialist equipment for hospitals, e.g. the Mahindra Group used their Research 
& Development facilities to create and produce new low-cost ventilators. Large networks of funders 
began raising funds for the development of a vaccine. Other private enterprises such as cab 
aggregators Ola and Uber began driving essential workers around the city. Hotels that were closed, 
began offering their rooms to healthcare workers and other essential workers that were unable to live 
at home or needed to be closer to work, thus supporting the government in their efforts to combat 
the pandemic. 
Networks and partnerships 
Strong networks and partnerships are a pre-requisite for information and knowledge to flow between 
actors in a system. Often individuals (as opposed to organisations more broadly) and their linkages to 
others are crucial for the formation of new networks and partnerships. In the case of Mumbai, we see 
this in the way individuals came together as individual citizens, as leaders of NPOs, as volunteers from 
the private sector, and as representatives of GMH and BMC to address this crisis. For example, 
individuals began organising themselves into networks and enabling aid to flow to migrants and day 
labourers. This involvement has taken several forms:  
1) it included citizens working with existing NPOs to expand the teams that hand out essentials, 
and providing food and shelter; 
2) it included starting up collaborations between BMC, GMH and NPOs to coordinate the relief 
effort on the ground, in particular with respect to working with poor and marginalised 
communities that NPOs already had experience engaging with;  
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3) it involved organising funding and the logistics of collecting essentials for existing 
organisations;  
4) it involved starting up new networks and organisations for the explicit purpose of reacting to 
the pandemic and the need for additional relief efforts; 
5) it involved individual citizens engaging in loosely formed online networks to coordinate direct 
relief where needed in the city, working with NPOs and local government, and  
6) it involved individual citizens undertaking their own individual efforts, such as cooking food 
and delivering it to people in need stranded nearby, providing funding to those in the 
neighbourhood and supporting their maids, cooks or drivers that no longer had a source of 
income.  
These newly formed networks and partnerships between different actors were active in online and 
offline modes, with offline modes helping to direct efforts on the ground, and spreading awareness, 
while online fundraising platforms made it easy for organisations to announce requests allowing 
citizens to respond. Communication apps such as WhatsApp have been vital in coordinating efforts, 
made easier by a well-functioning mobile network and the popularity of WhatsApp among a wide 
range of social groups.  
Individual citizens’ newly formed networks and NPOs on the one hand and the BMC and GMH and its 
agencies on the other hand, appear to have found complementary ways of working. While NPOs and 
citizen groups were quick to react, the public sector often moved more slowly. This may be due to the 
NPO’s long history of working in the most affected low-income urban areas as well as their pre-existing 
networks which are built on solid foundations of trust. The public sector would often take longer to 
respond which is not surprising as the different government entities sit at the core of the system (as 
discussed in the theory section) with multiple layers of administration to negotiate and competing 
priorities to manage. However, when the government does respond, it appears to have a greater 
impact than NPOs and citizens.  
Knowledge and information sharing 
In the response to COVID-19 and to facilitate knowledge and information sharing across the various 
actors, both the traditional and the social media played an important part as knowledge brokers and 
information sharers with continuous reporting on the pandemic, including the latest restrictions. This, 
however, has occasionally also led to misinformation and fearmongering, for example WhatsApp 
messages going viral on the spread of COVID-19, or news media whipping up fear.  
The way knowledge and information is shared within the system and how feedback loops play out 
within and between actors affects how learning occurs and how actors are able to respond and react 
to challenges. In the context of this pandemic, several forms of knowledge and information flows 
occurred. E.g., the government shared information with citizens, private enterprises and NPOs, 
including daily status updates, regular video addresses by the CM via social media and TV, frequent 
press releases and on-the-ground awareness raising (driving around in vehicles with loud speakers) by 
civil servants at state and BMC level.  
Traditional media - TV, radio and online newspapers (offline newspaper distribution was prohibited 
during lockdown) – provided daily updates on the spread of COVID-19, and on the policies put in place 
by the local and state governments. In addition, social media was used both by citizens and the 
government to also share information about the spread of COVID-19 but also to request disaster relief 
for different localities and to appeal for help and funding. Lastly, citizen-to-citizen information sharing 
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at various levels took place – word of mouth between families and friends; within housing societies or 
among employees; and broadcasts to larger groups to self-organise fundraising and relief efforts.  
Coordination of responses to a crisis situation is significantly enhanced by the ease with which 
knowledge and information flows. Feedback loops and information sharing can lead to improved 
responses as actors in the system have more information on which to act. This is evident, for example, 
in the way the government, NPOs and citizens were able to respond to the crisis, as well as inform 
one-another through, e.g., social media channels, such as Twitter, where they could connect with 
GMH and BMC representatives including senior GMH politicians, through tweets. 
On the other hand, knowledge and information flows as well as feedback loops can have negative 
effects when they work poorly, i.e., the sometimes slow filtering down of news about updated 
regulatory and policy decisions from the decision-makers at the top to the implementers at the local 
level (including local level officials, neighbourhood police, or hospital management) meant that the 
implementation of those changes was hampered leading to confusion and a lack of clarity in the 
meantime. E.g., when the government allowed individuals to move outside to buy food, they would 
still get into trouble with local police; or trucks carrying food and essential goods struggled to get 
through check posts even though they should have been allowed to pass, thus disrupting the supply-
chain affecting wholesale markets and causing a shortage of food and essentials in the city. However, 
knowledge and information flows as well as feedback loops improved over time.  
Hard and soft institutions 
Finally, we take a look at hard and soft institutions as they govern the way actors relate to each other 
within the system. Institutions influence the way actors behave and knowledge flows within a system. 
Hard institutions include the three levels of government that we described above, i.e. the GOI, the 
GMH and the BMC and their rules and regulations which applied to Mumbai during this pandemic. 
Soft institutions are the habits and practices shaped by traditions and culture that shape reactions and 
actions of the various actors that are linked within a system. This includes, for example, the way 
citizens respond to the need for social distancing to reduce the spread of the virus, and the level of 
monitoring and policing required to enforce the lockdown. Social distancing often proved difficult in 
public spaces, which resulted in lockdown as well as in the requirement to wear masks. However, by 
and large, the citizens of Mumbai have been compliant with the lockdown and crisis response 
measures imposed by the government, likely because of well-functioning institutions.  
Conclusion 
In this paper, we employed a systems-thinking approach to better understand how the response to 
COVID-19 in Mumbai played out focusing on the first wave of the pandemic (11 March to 9 September 
2020) acknowledging that India’s COVID-19 crisis is far from over. For example, the second wave, that 
began in March 2021, saw a dramatic rise in infections putting relentless pressure on India’s public 
health system leading to the involvement of a range of new actors such as international donors and 
foreign governments which yields additional insights from a systems perspective but this is beyond 
the scope of this paper.  
Analysing the first wave of COVID-19, we find a large network of multiple actors, i.e. government 
agencies, NPOs, private enterprises and citizens, that were inter-related in various ways. Existing 
networks and partnerships among these actors were important but given the unique nature of the 
current pandemic, new partnerships were formed, and new modes of knowledge and information 
sharing were explored, such as the extensive use of social media, WhatsApp, etc. 
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We find that the various actors involved in responding to this crisis had to continuously adapt, 
innovate and find new solutions, often with scarce funding available, and they had to prioritise among 
a long list of urgent tasks.  
With regard to more specific lessons learnt, first, we find that rapidly expanding the public sector 
healthcare infrastructure by improving and upgrading existing infrastructure and setting up new 
temporary structures such as the BKC Jumbo Covid-19 Centre was incredibly important. Doing so 
whilst also making the decision (by GMH) to take over control of 80% of private hospital beds in the 
state as well as to put in place caps on pricing of services and medical supplies ensured that private 
sector healthcare providers cooperated. 
Second, throughout the first wave, NPOs played an important role in relief work at the community 
level. By having nimble operations, and using their existing grassroots connections, they were able to 
quickly pivot their operations to provide relief of various kinds during the pandemic. While the scale 
of government reach is much larger, NPOs were faster in their ability to react and configure to respond 
to the crisis. The BMC and GMH working closely with NPOs therefore enabled a rapid response in 
specific geographies (e.g. Dharavi) or on specific issues (e.g. migrant crisis) that could be scaled up 
over time.  
Third, ensuring good feedback loops between different parts of the system was vital in tackling 
multiple crises at the same time. Daily announcements on social media (via Facebook and Twitter) as 
well as regular broadcasts and interviews with representatives of BMC and GMH ensured that citizens 
were aware of the latest updates on caseloads, spread of the virus, and any precautionary measures 
that were put in place, such as lockdowns. Social media became an important channel to communicate 
updates and issues from different parts of the city by citizens and NPOs. For example, when supply-
chains were disrupted in the early days of the lockdown due to a lack of clarity on the different rules 
across the various districts, citizens were able to voice their concerns on social media and engage with 
BMC directly. News media followed up on citizen complaints, and government acted on feedback to 
eventually ensure smoother supply-chains and distribution of goods.  
Fourth, recognising that not all parts of the system always move in the same way at the same time, 
Maharashtra took a decentralised approach which allowed decision-making closer to the ground and 
adjusted to the local context. While the broader framework of lockdown management was laid down 
by the GOI and the GMH, it was to a large extent BMC that took decisions on a day-to-day basis on 
handling the crisis in Mumbai. Even within the city, there were distinct differences between different 
wards, depending on the rate of infected citizens and the available infrastructure and housing context. 
For example, densely populated neighbourhoods of the city, including its informal settlements, 
employed strategies such as door-to-door testing, and mandatory quarantine in purpose-built 
facilities for COVID-19 infected individuals as well as their family members. Likewise, whole housing 
complexes were declared containment zones with very strict measures in place when there were too 
many COVID-19 cases. However, in less densely populated areas with fewer COVID-19 infections, 
there was no regular testing and very few resources devoted to monitoring the situation. Citizens in 
these areas also did not experience many restrictions in terms of moving around within the 
neighbourhood. Since the first wave of COVID-19, this decentralised approach has been further 
strengthened, with each ward in the city having set up its own War Room, as a first port of call for 
citizens. The War Room teams monitor caseloads, check availability of testing facilities and medical 
beds as well as monitor other infrastructure in the ward. They also assess COVID-19 infected 
individuals as to whether they could remain at home or would need to be taken to a hospital or any 
other healthcare facility for further treatment (The Hindu, 2021).  
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Finally, we conclude that a multifaceted and evolutionary response integrating a multitude of players 
is the most effective response mode to a crisis of this scale. The lessons learnt from the crisis 
management observed in Mumbai will hopefully have implications for how best to deal with future 
crises – health, economic or climate change related - in complex developing country contexts. Unlike 
any other event before, COVID-19 has demonstrated that decisions made to deal with one crisis, i.e. 
COVID-19, may lead to other secondary and tertiary crises which we suggest should be considered 
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